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PRESENT: HON. STEPHAN SCHICK 
JUSTICE 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
RECENED GaeN. 
N'iS Qff\CE Of 1\\f. t-.TIOR~ 
tltA'f O 8 10\l 
Cl.AlMS & UTlGATIO~E 
POUGHKEEPS\E om 
At a Special Term of the Sullivan County 
Supreme Court, held in and for the County 
of Sullivan, in the V~e..QfMonticello, 
New York, on the J day J$1f 017 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF SULLIVAN 
In the Matter of the Application of 
ROBERT SETH HA YES,# 74-A-2280 
Petitioner, 
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the 
Civil Practice Law and Rules 
-against-
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
TINA STANFORD, CHAIRPERSON 
Respondent. 
APPEARANCES: EV A ROSAHN, ESQ. 
277 Broadway, Suite 1501 
New York, New York I 0007 
Attorney for Petitioner 
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDER MAN 
Attorney General for the State of New York 
DECISION AND ORDER 
INDEX NO. 200-2017 
(Jeane L. Strickland Smith, Esq., AAG of Counsel) 
One Civic Center Plaza, Suite 40 I 
Poughkeepsie, New York 12224 
Attorneys for the Respondent 
SCHICK, J .. 
Petitioner commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging respondenfs 
determination which denied his application for parole release and held him for an additional 24 
month period. 
Petitioner is in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community 
Services (DOCCS) serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment. Petitioner was convicted of 
crimes committed in three separate incidences. In 1974, he was found guilty of Murder in the death 
of a transit authority police officer. The petitioner was also convicted of the crimes of Possession of 
a Weapon, Robbery in the First Degree and Grand Larceny in the Third Degree for stealing a vehicle 
at gunpoint from another victim. In June, 1974 the petitioner was sentenced to a term of 25 years to 
life on the murder conviction and concurrent lesser terms on the remaining convictions. In July 197 4, 
the petitioner was involved in an incident whereby he shot and wounded four police officers. 
Petitioner was found guilty of four counts of Attempted Murder and was sentenced to a term of25 
years to life on each count. In 1975, the petitioner pied guilty to the crime of Possession of a Weapon 
for firing a gun at two police officers on patrol. 
The petitioner appeared before the Parole Board for his tenth parole hearing on June 14, 
2016. After the interview, the Board issued its decision denying petitioner's release and ordered 
petitioner held for 24 months. The Panel concluded that: 
After carefully reviewing your record, a personal interview, and due 
deliberation of this Panel concludes that discretionary release is not 
presently warranted as your release would be incompatible with the 
welfare of society. You stand convicted of the serious offenses of Att. 
Murder (5 counts), Murder, Criminal Possession of a Weapon and 
Grand Larceny. 
Your criminal history indicates that these crimes of conduct throughout 
2 
1973 in which you targeted police, was your first contact with the 
law. The Panel takes note of all statutory factors including your 
rehabilitative efforts and programming, risk and needs assessment, 
case plan, re-entry plans, letters of support, community opposition, 
sentencing minutes and your disciplinary record. You have not had a 
disciplinary since 1999. 
The Panel reviewed your present and past parole packets and even 
the psychological risk assessment submitted previously by Joel 
Schoir,' PhD, on your behalf. 
The Panel p.otes that the community opposition to your release is extremely 
forceful, strong, recent and consistent. You targeted police. Police 
officers are the last line of defense in a civil society. 
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal-with the Division of Parole Appeals Unit on September 
l, 2016. On or about October 11, 2016, the appeal was denied by the respondent. Petitioner now 
brings this CPLR Article 78 proceeding. 
Initially, the petitioner alleges the Board failed to comply with Executive Law§ 259-c(4) 
which requires the Board to use procedures to measure an inmate's rehabilitation and the likelihood 
of success upon release. The petitioner maintains his parole denial should be vacated. 
In 2011, Executive Law§ 259-c(4) was amended to require the Board to "establish written 
procedures for its use in making parole decisions" and to consider the person's likelihood of success 
upon release to parole supervision. Executive Law § 259-i(2)( c) was amended to consolidate into 
one section the complete list of factors the Board is required to consider in evaluating applications 
for parole release. The amendments to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c) became effective in 
administrative hearings conducted on or after October 1, 2011. 
Petitioner's parole release interview was subject to the requirements of Executive Law § 
259-c(4). The petitioner alleges the decision of the Board was irrational and did not consider alJ of 
the requirements of Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c). (Matter of Thwaites v. NYS Board of Parole, 34 
3 
Misc3d 694 [Sup. Ct. 2011]). 
A review of the record indicates the Board considered the requirements of the Executive Law 
relating to parole release. The amendments to Executive Law 259-i(2)(c) did not result in a 
substantiative change in the criteria which the Parole Board should consider in rendering its 
decisions. (Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197 [3rd Dept. 2014]).). This Court finds the factors that 
must be considered for release e>n parole were adequately considered here. The record does not 
demonstrate that the Parole Board failed to consider the statutory factors set forth in Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c). (Goldberg v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 103 AD3d 634 [2°d Dept. 2013)]. 
As stated in Executive Law §259-i (2) (c)(A): 
"Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after considering ifthere is a re~onable probability that, 
if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of 
his crime as to undermine respect for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require 
that the following be considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals and 
accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, 
therapy and interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as a 
participant in a temporary release program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services available to the inmate; (iv) any 
deportation order issued by the federal government against the inmate; ( v) any statement made to the 
board by the crime victim or the victim's representative ... " 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory requirements, 
will not be disturbed. (Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320 [3d Dept. 2015]). If the Parole 
Board's decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements, the Board's determination 
is not subject to judicial review. (Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 AD3d 
1268 [3rd Dept. 2014]). Furthermore, only a "showing ofinationality bordering on impropriety" on 
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the part of Uie Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention. (Matter of Silmon 
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 4 70 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 
69 [ 1980]). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary 
determination made by the Parole Board. (Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 AD3d 1413 [41h Dept. 2014]). 
With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the merits of petitioner's case. 
Petitioner argues the decision to deny him parole was irrational, arbitrary and capricious, and 
resulted in a gross abuse of discretion. A Board's determination denying parole release will not be 
disturbed unless there is a "showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety" (Matter of Silmon v. 
Travis, 95 NY2d at 476). The Court finds the Parole Board considered the relevant factors in 
making its decision and its determination was supported by the record. The decision was sufficient 
to apprise petitioner of the reasons for the denial of discretionary release. A review of the transcript 
of the parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offenses, attention was paid to such 
factors as petitioner's institutional programming and his plans upon release. He was given an 
opportunity to make a statement in support of his release. The Board also had petitioner's sentencing 
minutes, Inmate Status Report, Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, a COMPAS Reentry Risk 
Assessment and a COMPAS Case Plan which details petitioner's institutional adjustment, 
programming, disciplinary record, proposed release plans, criminal history, risk factors and the facts 
of the current offense. Petitioner claims his COMP AS risks levels were low. Contrary to petitioner's 
claim, the COMP AS assessment is but one of many documents the Board now considers when 
making its parole release decisions. (Matter of Thomas v. Evans, 109 AD3d 1069 prd Dept. 2013]). 
While the Board must consider the conclusion reached through use of the COMPAS assessment, it 
may draw a different conclusion regarding the risks posed by the petitioner's release. (Matter of 
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Rtvera v. New 'York State Div. of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107 [3'd Dept 2014]). 
The Court notes the Board was free to place emphasis on the seriousness of petitioner's 
instant offenses. (Matter of Montalvo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 AD3d 1438 [3d Dept. 
2008]). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it 
considered in determining the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one. (Matter of 
Vigliotti v. State of New York Executive Div. of Parole, 98 AD3d 789 [3rd Dept. 2012]; 
(Matter of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3d Dept. 2008]). The 
determination is not rendered improper by the Parole Board's failure to "expressly discuss each of 
these guidelines in its determination" (Matter of Kin~ v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d 
788 [ 1994 ]). In addition, Executive Law§ 259-i(2) does not grant parole release merely as a reward 
for petitioner's good conduct or achievements while incarcerated. (Matter of Mentor v. New York 
State Division of Parole, 87 AD3d 1245 [3rc1 Dept. 2011]). The Court finds it was not irrational for 
the Board to place more weight on instant offenses than petitioner's institutional accomplishments 
and plans for release. (Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d at 1273-
1274). Petitioner has failed to meet his burden showing the Board did not consider the relevant 
statutory factors or that the decision was irrational, arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. 
Petitioners conclusionary allegation that the Board's decision was predisposed to denying 
him release is without merit. (Matter of Connelly v. New York State Division of Parole, 286 AD2d 
792 [3n1 Dept. 2001], appeal dismissed 97 NY2d 677 [2001]). In addition, petitioner's allegations 
of bias on the part of the Board are not supported by the record and petitioner failed to offer proof 
that the outcome of this case flowed from the alleged bias. (Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 
AD2d 777 [3rd Dept. 2000], Iv denied 95 NY2d 769 [2001]). The Parole Board is required to 
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consider the same factors each time the petitioner appears for a parole 1elease hewing. (Mattei of 
Williams v. New York State Division of Parole, 70 AD3d 1106 [3rd Dept. 201 O[, lv denied 17 NY3d 
709 [2010]). The record discloses the Board rendered its determination after considering the full 
record, including the hearing testimony, the petitioner's institutional background, his achievements, 
his criminal history and release plans. (Matter of Marziak v. Alexander, 62 AD3d 1227 [3rd Dept. 
2009]; Matter of Salahuddin v. Dennison, 34 AD3d 1082 [3rd Dept. 2006]). 
Petitioner's claim that he was denied due process has been examined and found to be without 
merit. Executive Law § 259-i, does not create an entitlement to release on parole and therefore does 
not create interests entitled to due process. (Paunetto v. Hammock, 516 F. Supp 1367 [US Dist. Ct., 
SDNY, 1981 ]). There is no due process right to parole. (Russo v. New York State Board of Parole, 
50 NY2d at 73). Also, there is no due process right to an inmate obtaining a statement as to what he 
should do to improve his chances for parole in the future. (Matter of Francis v. New York State 
Division of Parole. 89 AD3d 1312 [3rd Dept. 2005]). Nor does the denial of parole constitute double 
jeopardy. (Matter of Patterson v. Goord, 1AD3d845 [3rd Dept. 2003]). Petitioner's allegation that 
the denial of parole was akin to re-sentencing is without merit. (Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 AD3d 
1320 [3rd Dept. 2011]). 
Petitioner maintains the Board should not have considered community opposition to his 
parole release. Petitioner claims as a "result of the solicitation of emails by the N. Y.C. Police 
Benevolent Association (PBA) in furtherance of their explicit position that no one convicted of 
homicide of a police officer should ever be released from prison, no matter the sentencing judge's 
recommendations or the parole applicants's particular facts." Petitioner contends Executive Law 
259-i does not allow the Board to consider opposition statements from the public. Petitioner claims 
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the statements from the publlc may contain erroneous informabon tliat should not have been 
considered by the Board. 
Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) provides a crime victim or his/her closest surviving 
relative an opportunity to present a statement to the Parole Board containing information relevant 
to the inmate and the crime victim. Executive Law§ 259-i [2][c][B] provides "where a crime victim 
or victim's representative ... or other person submits to the parole board a written statement 
concerning the release of an inmate, the parole board shall keep that individual's name and address 
confidential." Executive Law§ 259-i does not restrict the opportunity of the public from submitting 
a statement or comment in regard to an inmate's parole release request as the statute refers to "other 
person". The Board may Consider statements from "other persons" in addition ~o a victim or his/her 
family. 
This Court is mindful of the holding in Matter of Comfort v. New York State Board of 
Parole, I 01AD3d1450 [3rd Dept. 2012]). In Comfort. the Court reversed the denial of parole release 
finding the Board relied upon significant letters in opposition to petitioner's release that contained 
an erroneous characterization of petitioner's conviction and "it was error for the Board to credit those 
tainted letters." The petitioner in this proceeding has not alleged or demonstrated that the Board 
considered any erroneous letters or emails from the public that influenced their decision in denying 
parole release. Petitioner's allegation that the Board may have considered erroneous information 
supplied by public opposition is merely speculative. It would not be unusual for the NYC PBA to 
oppose parole release of thos<? inmates who have been convicted of the murder of a police officer. 
The allegation that the Board considered erroneous information provided by community opposition 
is unfounded. The petitioner was denied parole release for reasons other than community opposition. 
8 
(Matter of Ebbs, 54 AD2d 611 [41t1 Dept. 1976], appeal deruea 40 NV2d 897 (1976]). The Parole 
Board denied parole release pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i based upon the many factors 
discussed herein. 
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds them 
to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was in accordance with the statutory 
requirements and was not excessive, irrational, arbitrary, capricious or in violation of lawful 
procedure. (Matter of Russo v. NYS Board of Parole, 50 NY2d at 77). The Petition is therefore 
dismissed. 
This shall constitute the Decision, Order and Judgment of the Court. This Decision, 
Order and Judgment is being returned to the attorneys for respondent. All original supporting 
documentation is being filed with the Sullivan County Clerk's Office. The signing of this 
Decision, Order and Judgment shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR 2220. Counsel are 
not relieved from the applicable provisions of that rule relating to filing, entry, and notice of 
entry. 
Dated: 
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED. 
ENTER. 
ffACJ.f 
i!f'ftl 3 ,2017 
Monticello, New York 
Supreme Court Justice 
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Pipers Considered: 
1. Notice of Petition undated; Verified Petition dated February 1, 2017 with annexed 
exhibits A-D; 
2. Verified Answer and Return dated March 7, 2017 with annexed exhibits 1-12; 
3. Affinnation of Eve Rosahn, Esq. dated March 16, 2017. 
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